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A DOUBLE STANDARD: THE UNITED
STATES' PLEA FOR PER SE ILLEGALITY
OF THE JAPANESE KEIRETSU
I. INTRODUCTION
Keiretsu, a term that even Japanese observers do not consis-
tently define, are groupings of companies .. that are related
by cross-shareholding agreements, interlocking directorates
or, most frequently, simply by a pattern of dealing predomi-
nantly among group members.'
In 1992 the United States worldwide trade deficit in mer-
chandise was a record high of nine billion dollars for the
month of August alone. Our bilateral trade deficit with Japan
was forty-three billion dollars in 1991, nearly two-thirds of the
total United States worldwide trade deficit. The deficit reached
a high of $59.8 billion in 1987,2 and while it subsequently
appeared to be leveling off, the balance is tipping once again in
favor of the Japanese. In fact, some statisticians estimate that
our worldwide trade deficit could be as high as $120 billion for
1992, with correspondingly astonishing figures expected for our
balance of payments with Japan. Americans gasp in horror at
the negative implications of these figures and scream, "Do
something!" So some individuals are trying- to do something,
and the main thing they are trying to do is blame the Japa-
nese keiretsu for our trade deficit.
To many observers, the existence of the trade deficit
means that the Japanese are selling more products to the
United States than Americans are selling to Japan.3 Ameri-
1. Laurence W. Bates, Japan's New Disclosure Rules and Keiretsu Relation-
ships, E. AsIAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 15, 1991, at 7.
2. See Brian W. Semkow, The American Trade Deficit With Japan: Whither
the Role of Japanese Financial Deregulation and Liberalization?, 13 MD. J. INTL L.
& TRADE 39, 40 (1988).
3. The alarm over the trade deficit assumes that a negative balance of trade
is necessarily bad. For an argument to the contrary, see infra note 44. Indeed,
some commentators focus on the benefits to American consumers of the availability
of high-quality, inexpensive Japanese products-an availability which has been co-
existent with the trade deficit. See Michael Kinsley, Protectionist Paranoia, NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 15, 1982, at 10, 11.
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cans often find it hard to accept the possibility that American
products may be passed over in a preference for Japanese
products, as if this were contrary to natural law. They insist
that the only way to explain this trend is that the Japanese
are doing something underhanded to gain an advantage. The
business leaders and members of Congress who are responsible
for sounding the trade imbalance alarm contend that the Japa-
nese are not playing by the same rules as we are-that their
markets are closed to us while ours are open to them. They are
also certain that if American products are being passed over,
then American jobs are being lost to overseas employees as
well.4 In many circles, the search for the cause of our apparent
inability to penetrate the Japanese market leads again and
again to one major culprit-the Japanese keiretsu.5 Members
of a keiretsu are known to prefer to deal with other members of
their group rather than with members of other keiretsu or
independent companies. As a result, disgruntled Americans
conclude that domestic companies are being denied a portion of
the Japanese market that is rightfully theirs.6
The disagreement over the openness of Japan's market is
not a new one, but recent efforts to redress the trade imbal-
ance by urging the Japanese to eliminate "unfair" business
practices have rekindled the debate. If the Japanese would
just cooperate with the requests of the United States,8 then,
domestic officials claim, American companies would increase
4. Americans are hyper-sensitive when it comes to jobs, so the prospect of
their loss poses a serious threat. This is especially apparent during a recession.
The emphasis on both the loss and the creation of jobs during the 1992 Presiden-
tial election demonstrates this national concern. See, e.g., The 1992 Campaign;
Transcript of 3d T.V. Debate Between Bush, Clinton and Perot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 1992, at 20; The 1992 Campaign; Transcript of 2d T.V. Debate Between Bush,
Clinton and Perot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1992, at 11; The 1992 Campaign; Tran-
script of the First Debate Among Bush, Clinton and Perot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1992, at 14.
5. For a full definitional discussion of these corporate groupings, see infra
part II.C.
6. See, e.g., Japan's Keiretsu System: Hearing Before Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1991) (statement of Dana Mead, Executive Vice
President of International Paper Company) ("Our problem is not with imports into
the United States of Japanese paper. Our problem is absence of exports of U.S.
paper into this very large and growing market where we should be.") [hereinafter
Japan's Keiretsu System].
7. The chief efforts in this direction have resulted in an agreement known as
the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII). See infra note 15.
8. For a list of these requests, see infra text accompanying note 25.
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their sales to Japan, the increased sales would reduce the
trade deficit, and jobs at home would be preserved. It sounds
like a wonderful plan-but things are not proceeding as antici-
pated. The conclusion in July 1992 of the second annual prog-
ress report meetings for the Structural Impediments Initiative
(SII)-an agreement whereby the United States and Japan are
attempting to harmonize their economic systems-left partici-
pants with the sense that very little had been accomplished.9
While improvements were evident in some areas targeted for
change under the SII-such as in the large retail store
laws'-the United States was largely dissatisfied with
Japan's efforts. The main discontent was with Japan's promise
to enforce more strictly its antimonopoly law against the per-
ceived Granddaddy of trade barriers-the keiretsu."
If there is one thing that is clear about keiretsu, it is that
they upset Americans, especially American business leaders
with whom they are in direct competition. 2 For instance, the
American auto parts industry is outraged that Japanese-trans-
plant auto-manufacturing firms (Japanese companies operating
in America) are still buying most of their component parts
from Japanese suppliers.3 One of the most vocal enemies of
the keiretsu, and possibly the one most responsible for focusing
criticism on them, has been American corporate raider
extraordinaire, T. Boone Pickens. Ever since his takeover at-
tempt of Toyota's related component part manufacturer, Koito,
9. See, e.g., Leslie Helm, U.S.-Japan Talks End, But Barriers Remain, L.A.
TIMES, July 31, 1992, at D2; Andrew Pollack, Gain in Trade-Gap Talks with Ja-
pan, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1992, at D7; T.R. Reid, Unique U.S. Approach to Japan
Trade Talks Raises Questions, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1992, at A12.
10. Prior to the changes, the wait associated with gaining administrative
clearance to open a large retail store in Japan was prohibitively long. See Gary R.
Saxonhouse, Japan, SII and the International Harmonization of Domestic Economic
Practices, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450 (1991).
11. The Japanese are puzzled by the animosity directed at the keiretsu. They
see these long-term corporate relationships as a practical, efficient, and stable
element pivotal to their success under a purportedly capitalist system. See Bill
Powell & Rich Thomas, Japan: All in the Family, NEWSWEEK, June 10, 1991, at
38. Supporters of the tradition attack the assumptions concerning keiretsu behavior
and conclusions concerning its effects, urging that keiretsu are not the villains they
are perceived to be. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 39-56 and accompanying text.
13. See Dana Milbank,' Culture Clash: Making Honda Parts, Ohio Company
Finds, Can be Road to Ruin, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1990, at Al, reprinted in 138
CONG. REC. H2079 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1992) (article introduced by Rep. Collins).
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went sour, he has conducted a campaign consisting of letter
writing, public speaking, and testifying before Congress in
order to induce government action against the keiretsu tradi-
tion.14
There is evidence which suggests that the keiretsu are not
behaving as unfairly as the doomsayers in the United States
would have everyone believe. Even if the accusations were
valid, however, United States enemies of keiretsu seem to be
promoting a stringent antitrust approach that has not been
used against analogous practices in the United States for over
a decade. Given that this approach would condemn common
business practices currently tolerated in the United
States-and used even by those who are actively vocal against
the keiretsu-it is likely that inadvertent hypocrisy, rather
than an honest desire for a universally heightened standard of
scrutiny, is responsible for this inconsistency.
This Note first presents as a backdrop the major trade
developments that have typified the turbulent relationship
between the United States and Japan over the last decade.
Next, it takes a closer look at American perceptions surround-
ing the keiretsu and the visceral reactions these perceptions
have invoked. It then goes on to explain what the keiretsu
really are and compares their behavior to similar business
behavior in the United States. An analysis of the United States
antitrust approach to the analogous activity follows. Finally,
this Note concludes that the antitrust-based criticism currently
directed toward the Japanese keiretsu is misplaced given the
inaccuracy of its suggested standards of analysis and the toler-
14. T. Boone Pickens's letters have been read into the Congressional record by
sympathizers to his failed takeover attempt, see, e.g., T. Boone Pickens, Make
Japan Play by the Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1992 (Letter to the Editor), at A17,
reprinted in 138 CONG. REc. E548 (daily ed. Mar. j5, 1992) (letter introduced by
Rep. Schulze), and he has appeared himself before Congress to testify. See Japan's
Keiretsu System, supra note 6.
The argument spawned by Pickens's efforts necessarily raises related de-
bates over issues which, in some cases, are as old as the country itself: Should we
protect the home market? Are the antitrust laws intended to protect competitors,
or merely competition? This Note will not attempt to delve into the issues raised
by these questions, much less to answer them. Rather, it will highlight common
misperceptions regarding the nature and behavior of the keiretsu and show how
the manner in which the United States antitrust laws are being invoked to solve
the "keiretsu problem" seems inappropriate once the true nature of keiretsu is
understood.
[Vol. XIX:31104
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ance that similar practices have enjoyed in the United States
for over a decade.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Structural Impediments Initiative15
The bilateral trade imbalance between the United States
and Japan began to grow in the late 1970s, reaching a high of
$59.8 billion in 1987.16 An increasing discomfort among trade
officials, American business leaders, and members of Congress
over our inability to control the rising deficit accompanied the
growth of the trade imbalance. The imbalance has been pri-
marily attributed to the plethora of sales in Japanese automo-
biles, machine tools, and home electronics within the United
States.17 In 1989, in an effort to curtail the increase, the Un-
ited States Trade Representative (USTR) included Japan on a
list of countries to receive "Super 301" retaliation.'8 President
Bush decided to forego retaliation when he and then Japanese
Prime Minister Uno agreed to establish a joint task force to
investigate the underlying causes of trade barriers. 9 The task
force published a final report of its findings on June 28, 1990,
15. JOINT REPORT OF THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL
IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (1990) [hereinafter JOINT REPORT].
16. Shotaro Yachi, Beyond Trade Frictions-A New Horizon of U.S.-Japan Eco-
nomic Relations, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 389, 390 (1989).
17. MITSUO MATSUSHITA & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 3 (1989).
18. See, e.g., Michael W. Punke, Comment, Structural Impediments to United
States-Japanese Trade: The Collision of Culture and Law, 23 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
55, 69 (1990). Under Super 301, foreign states suspected of engaging in unfair
trading can be designated by the United States Trade Representative (USTR) as
the subject of a priority investigation with the potential imposition of severe sanc-
tions. In May 1989, the USTR named Japan such a "problem trading partner."
Y.S. Lanneaux, International Trade: Joint Report of the United States-Japan Work-
ing Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative, June 28, 1990, 32 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 245, 246 (1991).
19. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example of
Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 436, 439-40 (1991) [hereinafter
Matsushita, SII].
The task force was made up of officials from the U.S. Departments of
State, Treasury, and -Commerce and members of the Japanese Foreign
Ministry, the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry. Three meetings were scheduled, the first of which was held
in September 1989, the second in February 1990 and the third in April
1990.
Id. at 440.
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which it presented to both government leaders.2" Thus, the
-Structural Impediments Initiative was born with its sugges-
tions for economic changes aimed at removing trade barriers in
both countries.2'
The primary objective of the SII was the harmonization of
internal economic policies in the United States and Japan.
Each side contended that various conditions and policies with-
in the other country were partially responsible for the rising
trade imbalance. The final report recommended that each
country undertake a number of changes. The United States
conceded that some domestic problems were contributing to the
deficit and agreed to implement seven major adjustments:
22
(1) stimulation of private saving (partially through reducing
the federal budget deficit); (2) reforms in certain domestic laws
to encourage joint ventures and direct foreign investment; (3)
reduction in the cost of capital; (4) additional government de-
regulation of imports and exports; (5) government funding for
research and development; (6) executive branch promotion of
exports; and (7) education and training of the workforceY. On
the Japanese side there were six major areas targeted for im-
provement:24 (1) savings and investment patterns; (2) land
policy; (3) the system of production distribution; (4)
exclusionary business practices; (5) keiretsu relationships; and
(6) pricing mechanisms.
As part of the SII negotiations, the Japanese government
agreed to authorize its Fair Trade Commission (FTC) to issue
Antimonopoly Act enforcement guidelines 2 covering the main
20. Id.
21. See JOINT REPORT, supra note 15.
22. JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 1-38. It should be noted that the United
States also has been unsuccessful in implementing its proposed changes-certainly
with respect to the budget deficit and savings rates. In fact, some suggest that the
Japanese have been more aggressive about implementing SII changes in their
economy than we have been in ours. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 9; Jacob M.
Schlesinger, U.S., Japan Spar Once More Over Trade, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1992,
at A10.
23. JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at 1-38.
24. JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at I-1 to VI-7. This Note focuses only on
the keiretsu relationships. For a commentary on the other areas which Japan has
agreed to address, see Saxonhouse, supra note 10.
25. JOINT REPORT, supra note 15, at I-1 to VI-7.
26. FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT GUIDELINES CONCERN-




areas of concern to the United States: distribution practices
and keiretsu relationships." The guidelines would serve as
the model of FTC enforcement policy toward which Japanese
businesses should conform their professional behavior. The
initial set of guidelines offered by the FTC dealt with practices
of foreign firms attempting to export to Japan rather than with
practices of firms within Japan.2" However, formal comments
submitted by the American Bar Association (ABA) and the
Section of International Law and Practice29 appear to have
influenced the final revised guidelines. 30 This last version of
the guidelines seemingly began to address the ABA's criticism
that the previous guidelines had not provided for increased
regulation of keiretsu activity.3' Among the activities targeted
under the final guidelines are the threat of coercion in exclu-
sive dealing arrangements, cross-shareholding, and refusals to
deal 32 -all activities in which keiretsu purportedly engage.
Even with the additional provisions directed somewhat
toward keiretsu behavior, some skeptics suspect that actual
enforcement of these provisions is unlikely, since the keiretsu
tradition is firmly rooted in Japanese culture.33 Therefore,
those who want to see results on the bottom line of the trade
imbalance are promoting a new age of protectionism theoreti-
27. For a general background on the evolution of the guidelines, see Abbott B.
Lipsky, Jr., Current Developments in Japanese Competition Law: Antimonopoly Act
Enforcement Guidelines Resulting from the Structural Impediments Initiative, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 279, 284 (1991).
28. FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, GUIDELINES FOR THE REGULATION OF UNFAIR
TRADE PRACTICES IN SOLE IMPORT DISTRIBUTORSHIP CONTRACTS, ETC. (1990) (Draft)
(preliminary translation); see also Lipsky, supra note 27, at 285.
29. Eleanor M. Fox, et al., American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
and Section of International Law and Practice Joint Comments on the Japan Fair
Trade Commission Antimonopoly Act Enforcement Guidelines Concerning "Unfair
Trade Practices in Sole Import Distributorship Contracts, Etc." and "Distribution
Systems and Business Practices" April 8, 1991, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 291 (1991); Elea-
nor M. Fox, et al., American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and Section
of International Law and Practice Joint Comments on the Outline of Proposed
Revisions to the Japan Fair Trade Commission Antimonopoly Act Enforcement
Guidelines Concerning "Unfair Trade Practices in Sole Import Distributorship Con-
tracts, Etc." and "Distribution Systems and Business Practices," June 7, 1991, 60
ANTITRUST L.J. 327 (1991).
30. See Lipsky, supra note 27, at 288.
31. See Lipsky, supra note 27, at 288-89.
32. FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 15-35.
33. See Japanese Competition Policies are Pondered by Senate Committee, [Ju-
ly-Dec.] Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1577, at 177 (Aug. 6, 1992).
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cally designed to pick up where the SII leaves off.34 They con-
tend that if Japan will not enforce its own antimonopoly laws
against the keiretsu, then perhaps we could apply our antitrust
laws extraterritorially.35 Other proposals include threatening
Super 301 retaliation 6 again (which, if successful, could im-
pose high tariffs on Japanese goods), and resorting to managed
trade (quotas) within certain industries." Even if the SII ne-
gotiations could lead to the destruction of keiretsu, there is no
guarantee that American businesses will reap any benefits.
Taiwan, Thailand, and South Korea-whose goods are inexpen-
sive and of high quality-may benefit more than the United
States from open Japanese markets.3 1 It seems less than pru-
dent to risk losing an essential trading partner over demands
which may not even yield beneficial results.
B. United States Perceptions of Keiretsu
It is evident that more than a few Americans are powerful-
ly upset by the Japanese keiretsu corporate groups:
34. See generally 138 CONG. REC. H6029 (daily ed. July 8, 1992); 138 CONG.
REC. E193 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Collins).
For an interesting debate presenting both sides of protectionism, see Firing
Line Debate, Resolved: U.S. Industry Does Not Need Protection (transcript of PBS
television program taped on Sept. 3, 1992) (on file with author).
While the protectionist measures themselves are not new, the frequency and
intensity of recent calls for their use has reached a level of urgency not seen in
decades. Few are willing to label themselves protectionist, but the proponents of
such policies are clearly getting louder and more shrill: "I'm called a protectionist,
but I'm really a free trader. The thing I want to protect is free trade. And the
way you do that is to retaliate against those who don't believe in it." L.A. Iacocca,
Address at the Economic Club of Detroit (Jan. 10, 1992), reprinted in 138 CONG.
REC. El08 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1992) (speech introduced by Rep. Dingell).
35. See Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 30 (statement of Dr. Ed-
ward J. Lincoln).
36. 138 CONG. REc. H3070 (daily ed. May 7, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Rostenkowski) ("[H.R. 5100] would extend the Super 301 authority which was en-
acted in the 1988 omnibus trade bill and proved effective in opening markets
during its 2-year existence. Its extension will give the administration an important
tool to pry open foreign markets which are now closed to U.S. exports.").
37. See Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 20-21 (statement of Mr.
Reilly). Not everyone is giving in to the cry for protection, see, e.g., 138 CONG.
REC. H6038 (daily ed. July 8, 1992) (statement of Rep. Crane) ("Already, [the auto
industry] has enjoyed more- than 10 years of quota protection. As we found with
the steel industry, such protection merely breeds noncompetitiveness and the de-
sire for more protection.").
38. See Peter B. Maretz, Antimonopoly Enforcement, 12 E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP., Oct. 15, 1990, No. 10, at 8; Helm, supra note 9, at D2.
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"I believe that Japan's keiretsu system may be the single
most important impediment today to better trade relations
with Japan." 9
"This keiretsu system ... is literally devastating American
industries and draining our Nation of jobs."4"
"American companies are not going one-on-one with Japa-
nese companies. They are up against a 500 pound gorilla."4'
"Simply put, their economy is rigged and the keiretsu
system is one of the most sinister aspects of the Japanese
economy.
4 2
Many Americans believe that Japan is simultaneously
"taking advantage of the openness of the world economy"43
and encouraging protectionist behavior at home. Keiretsu are
also perceived as a significant cause of the rising trade imbal-
ance and purported loss of American jobs to the Japanese."
Rather than seeing the trade imbalance as a reflection of indi-
vidual consumer choices or United States manufacturers' judg-
ments, Americans see it as a reflection of collusive practices by
39. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 3 (statement of Sen. Max
Baucus).
40. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Sen. Carl Lev-
in).
41. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Sen. Carl Lev-
in).
42. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 37 (statement of T. Boone
Pickens).
43. MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 17, at xv-xvi.
44. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. H6031 (daily ed. July 8, 1992) (statement of
Rep. Ford) ("The keiretsu supply system, which shuts out non-Japanese companies,
is the reason the United States exported less than $1 billion of auto parts to
Japan in 1990 at the same time they exported $10.6 billion in auto parts to the
United States. That trade deficit costs us 200,000 middle-class manufacturing
jobs.").
Others argue that when an American consumer can pay less on any one
item, then that consumer has more relative income to spend in other ways. The
less money spent on consumption, the more that can be devoted to investment and
wealth creation-which will itself lead to more jobs. See, e.g., Harry Binswanger,
"Buy American" is Un-American (II), THE OBJECTIVIST F., Aug. 1987, at 14 (on file
with author). A protectionist measure will shelter jobs in the particular industry
being protected at the expense of jobs in other sectors, and will have a devastat-
ing effect in the overall economy. See Leo Melamed, Protectionism-The Scourge of
Markets in the New World Order, reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. S5933 (daily ed.
May 5, 1992); FREDERIC BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS 106 (Arthur Goddard trans.,
1964); D. Tagliavia, Myths About International Trade: A Response to Attempts to
Protect the U.S. Automobile Industry 16 (CSE Legal Alliance, Wash. D.C., 1992)
(on file with author). For an interesting indictment of these protectionist tenden-
cies in general, see JAMES BOVARD, THE FAIR TRADE FRAUD 263-64 (1991).
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the Japanese against United States firms.45 On the other
hand, a few scholars feel that blaming the Japanese keiretsu
for American industry's inability to sell products in Japan
amounts to "scapegoating.'4 They suggest that much of the
responsibility should instead be focused on "domestic American
and European industries that have become too complacent
about the quality of their products and the ability to dominate
their traditional markets."47
The crux of the problem seems to be that keiretsu compa-
nies prefer to do business with familiar firms, so they join a
keiretsu to ensure long-term, stable business affiliations.4"
But Americans tend to be very suspicious of relationships
among companies; it sounds like something our antitrust laws
would prohibit.49 Whether or not the keiretsu could be consid-
ered illegal under United States antitrust laws will depend on
exactly what behavior they allegedly engage in. The keiretsu
are most often conceived of as cartels-horizontal agreements
among competitors which serve to restrict trade. If they are
indeed cartels, then they would be illegal under United States
antitrust laws-so many conclude that keiretsu would be illegal
by United States standards: °
45. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 46 (prepared statement of Sen.
Carl Levin) ("We've been virtually shut out of the Japanese $102 billion parts
market, and are now being similarly locked out of a part of our domestic mar-
ket."). For an interesting account of a domestic auto part manufacturer's "unfair"
run-in with a Japanese car manufacturer, see Milbank, supra note 13. But see
Japanese Business Methods; Couldn't We All Do a Little Bit Worse?, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 4, 1992, at 19 [hereinafter Japanese Business Methods] ("The industries
feared by the rest of the world have developed through a bare-knuckled market-
place fight that the government has hardly refereed, let alone controlled, and they
will change only as the market does . . ").
46. See, e.g., MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 17, at xvi.
47. MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 17, at xvi; see also Allan T.
Demare, What Now for the U.S. and Japan?, FORTUNE, Feb. 10, 1992, at 80 ("You
can make the argument that U.S. automakers blew the game decades ago. They
paid uncompetitively high wages, slipping the bill to consumers, and got sloppy in
manufacturing. Unchallenged by foreign rivals at home, they were uninterested in
what seemed the piddling Japanese market. Now they are getting their comeup-
pance.").
48. See Powell & Thomas, supra note 11, at 38 ("In the view of U.S. trade
negotiators, Japan's keiretsu companies tend to do business first among them-
selves, contributing to the ebbing but still huge bilateral trade imbalance between
the two countries.").
49. For a discussion of activities illegal under the antitrust laws, see infra
part III.
50. For a discussion of the different standards of analysis applied to horizon-
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"It is clear to me that Japan's keiretsus [sic] not only vio-
late United States and Japanese antitrust laws, they violate
every principal [sic] of free and fair trade."51
"[S]hould a practice like keiretsu be declared illegal... ?
In this country under our antitrust laws it would undoubtedly
be subject to the antitrust."52
"I think Congress has to give the Japanese car companies
a choice between ending the cartel-like practices or losing part
of their overall access to the U.S. market."
53
"In Japan, a series of cartels in production and distribu-
tion-known as keiretsus [sic]-work to exclude imports from
the Japanese market."54
The fact is that few Americans really know what Japanese
businesses are doing, or if what they are doing is illegal. Per-
haps the outcry is really a result of a general sense that Japan
is not playing fair,55 as suggested in a statement by Senator
Baucus:
[Tlhe Japanese do not wear black hats. They are not the
Darth Veders [sic] of the world. We Americans do not wear
white hats .... We have trade barriers ourselves. But it is
equally true that the shade of gray of Japanese hats is a lot
darker than the shade of gray of American hats.5 6
But is their "shade of gray" really darker? And are Senator
Baucus and the others even comparing the right hats?
tal agreements versus vertical agreements under the antitrust laws, see infra text
accompanying notes 106-16, 140-41.
51. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 37 (statement of T. Boone
Pickens).
52. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 22 (statement of Sen. Roth).
53. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 9 (statement of Sen. Levin).
54. See Reviewing Structural Impediments Initiative (SII): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 32 (1991) (prepared statement of Sen. Max Baucus) [hereinafter Reviewing S111.
55. Michael Kinsley coined the term "keiretsuphobia" to describe this visceral
reaction. Michael Kinsley, Keiretsuphobia, NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1991, at 4; see
also Carla Rapoport, Why Japan Keeps on Winning, FORTUNE, July 15, 1991, at
76, 77 ("The whole system sounds mighty unfair .... ."). But see Japan's Peculiar
Ways, Cont'd, ECONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 12 ("American trade negotiators like
to talk of 'structural impediments' to trade, such as the keiretsu system of co-
operation among companies, but the significance of such practices is exaggerated,
and they can hardly be labelled as 'unfair'.").
56. Japan's Keiretsu System, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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C. Keiretsu
Descriptions of the Japanese keiretsu are clouded by a
great deal of confusion. A preliminary historical background
would be helpful to understanding the structure and behavior
of keiretsu as well as the many misconceptions and apparent
prejudices surrounding them. One such misconception is that
the keiretsu are no different than the zaibatsu-the feared and
disliked Japanese corporate groups which existed prior to
World War II. This negative association may have engendered
a prejudicial attitude toward keiretsu. Also, the different kinds
of keiretsu are rarely distinguished. Since the various groups
are structurally and functionally different, lumping them into
one category creates a danger of making false accusations. In
addition, sometimes the extent of the behavior complained of is
itself exaggerated. Many of these accusations allege behavior
by the keiretsu that would be illegal under United States anti-
trust laws. But an accurate evaluation of their behavior re-
quires first an accurate understanding of the keiretsu. Then, to
make any antitrust analysis meaningful, the groups should be
analogized to situations in the United States which receive
antitrust scrutiny.
Prior to World War II, at the inception of Japan's industri-
alization efforts, key industries were developed and nurtured
by the Japanese government. Those industries were eventually
turned over to select companies in the private sector.57 These
family-owned corporate groups-known as zaibatsu-were
tightly governed by a central holding company. During World
War II, the government regained control of the zaibatsu to help
provide necessary supplies and financial support for the
war.5" This association between zaibatsu and the Japanese
war effort accounts for some of the current animosity toward
the modern corporate groups.
After the end of the war, the Allied Occupation Forces
(AOF) ordered the dissolution of the zaibatsu. Most of the
holding companies were abolished and the largest companies
within each zaibatsu were split into several new independent
57. See Hiroshi Oda, An Outline of the Japanese Anti-Monopoly Law, in JAPA-
NESE BANKING, SECURITIES AND ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 113 (Hiroshi Oda & R.
Geoffrey Grice eds., 1988).
58. See ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN 301 (Masanao Nakagawa ed.,
1984).
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companies.59 In addition, many of the people who had held
key positions both in government and in the zaibatsu were
removed from office, and younger, more technologically far-
sighted managers assumed their positions.6" In order to main-
tain what they believed to be the newly procompetitive struc-
ture of the economy, the AOF urged the Japanese to draft
legislation patterned after the United States antitrust laws.61
Thus, in 1947 the Japanese government adopted the Act Con-
cerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of
Fair Trade62-otherwise known as the Antimonopoly Act.
While some theorists believe that today's keiretsu are the
direct descendants of zaibatsu,63 this assumption may be too
simplistic. The prewar groups were governmentally created
and controlled through holding companies. 64 In contrast,
today's keiretsu are "loosely interdependent clusters of indepen-
dent companies" without central control.65 A few of the mod-
ern keiretsu bear the same name as the former zaibatsu-such
as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo-but the extent to which
they can be said to be descended from prewar groups is debat-
able.66 There are as many, if not more, current keiretsu which
are not clearly connected to the prewar groups.67
There is more than one kind of keiretsu; too often critics do
59. MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW 2
(1990); see also ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 58, at 301;
HIROSHI IYORI, ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN 10 (1969); Yoshi Tsurumi,
Japan's Challenge to the U.S.: Industrial Policies and Corporate Strategies, COLUM.
J. WORLD Bus. (1982), reprinted as: From Zaibatsu to Keiretsu: Japan's Industrial
Groupings are Not Exclusive Cartels, in PAC. BASIN Q., Summer/Fall 1990, at 9
[hereinafter Tsurumi, From Zaibatsu to Keiretsu].
60. See Tsurumi, From Zaibatsu to Keiretsu, supra note 59, at 9-10.
61. See ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN, supra note 58, at 301; Oda,
supra note 57, at 113.
62. Act No. 54 of April 14, 1947, LAW RELATING TO PROHIBITION OF PRIVATE
MONOPOLY AND METHODS OF PRESERVING FAIR TRADE (EHS Law Bull. Series)
Vol.II, Nos. 2270-79 (1978), translated in ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF JAPAN,
supra note 58, at 3-62.
63. See, e.g., Keiretsu and Other Large Corporate Groups in Japan, JAPAN
ECON. INST. REP., Jan. 12, 1990, at 1, 3 [hereinafter JEI REPORT].
64. See Oda, supra note 57, at 113.
65. Yoshi Tsurumi, Don't Beat the Keiretsu. Join Them., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2,
1992, § 3, at 11 [hereinafter Tsurumi, Don't Beat the Keiretsu].
66. For a discussion of the disagreement among commentators, see Tom Roehl,
Japanese Industrial Groupings: A Strategic Response to Rapid Industrial Growth 2
(Aug. 1988) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
67. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 3.
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not differentiate among them when making anticompetitive
accusations. The categorization is important, however, since
the different varieties do not manifest the same characteristics.
Precise categorization of keiretsu is a difficult task. There is
even disagreement over how many keiretsu actually exist.6" In
popular accounts where a distinction is drawn, keiretsu are
typically categorized either as "horizontal" or as "vertical."69
But these broad labels may themselves be misleading because
of their connotations under United States antitrust law. How-
ever, all keiretsu do share a few characteristics: cross-
shareholding, interlocking directorates, and a preference for
dealing within the group.7 °
The so-called horizontal keiretsu (which are the ones also
associated with the prewar zaibatsu) consist of various manu-
facturing, service, and trade firms cutting across many differ-
ent industries and centering loosely around a commercial
bank.7' The usual cross-shareholding by the core bank is lim-
ited to five percent ownership in other member companies. 2
Presumably it is because the companies within the group do
not stand in a buyer and seller (vertical) relationship that the
term "horizontal" was chosen. But the use of this label in rela-
tion to these groups is misleading. In the United States anti-
trust context, when we think of horizontal groups of companies
we are talking about the classic cartel 3-the heads of com-
peting manufacturers meet in a smoke-filled room and agree to
68. The financial keiretsu, discussed infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text,
have variously been broken down into seven major groups, see Tsurumi, From
Zaibatsu to Keiretsu, supra note 59, at 10, and six major groups, see JEI REPORT,
supra note 63, at 3.
69. See, e.g., Tsurumi, Don't Beat the Keiretsu, supra note 65.
70. See generally JEI REPORT, supra note 63. Functionally, the keiretsu form a
common defense against hostile takeovers by outsiders, whether Japanese or for-
eign-which may explain why T. Boone Pickens failed in his coup attempt with
Koito. More important, these relationships enable member companies to jointly
enter new businesses by pooling their capital, labor, technology, and other resourc-
es. When one member's business becomes obsolete, its surplus resources, particu-
larly labor, are re-allocated quickly to new ventures of other members. See
Tsurumi, Don't Beat the Keiretsu, supra note 65.
71. See Rapoport, supra note 55, at 81.
72. FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 31 (the limit is 10% for insurance
companies).
73. Cartels are groups of market competitors which make conspiratorial agree-
ments with each other to fix prices, divide territories, or otherwise to eliminate
competition outside the cartel. PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANAL-
YSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 9 217, at 226-27 (4th ed. 1988).
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set prices at a certain level to stop the competitive market
forces from driving their prices down. By keeping prices high
they guarantee their own profits. This image, however, does
not fit these keiretsu. The member companies of these keiretsu
are not in competition with one another. Any given group could
have, in addition to the bank, an insurance company, an auto-
mobile manufacturer, a construction company, a glass compa-
ny, a maker of home electronics, and many other diverse enter-
prises.74 These keiretsu might better be served by abandoning
the horizontal cartel stigma 75 and replacing it with a more
appropriate label--"financial keiretsu."
The vertical keiretsu, alternatively known as enterprise,
production, or industrial keiretsu, are groups generally ar-
ranged along production or distribution lines in support of a
manufacturer, like Toyota for example. Such a group might
include component part suppliers, a leading finished product
manufacturer, marketing companies, distributors, retailers,
and any other company involved between a product's concep-
tion and its purchase by consumers. 76 These groups are typi-
cally structured more like a pyramid with one core manufac-
turing firm at the apex.77 They also participate in cross-
shareholding but, since there are no legal restrictions on the
amount of ownership among firms, the core company will often
own larger percentages of its participating firms than is the
case in a financial keiretsu.7" This financial investment, as
well as the exchange of other resources, tends to flow in one
direction. Thus, Toyota will own shares in its suppliers but the
suppliers will not own shares in Toyota. Since the vertical
label is more suited to this type of keiretsu than is the horizon-
tal label suited to the financial groups, it will be retained here-
in.
Characterization becomes more difficult still when the
lines between vertical and financial keiretsu begin to blur. A
key firm in a vertical keiretsu may at the same time belong to
74. See, e.g., Angelina Helou, The Nature and Competitiveness of Japan's
Keiretsu, 25 J. WORLD TRADE 99 app. at 130-31 (1991); see also Rapoport, supra
note 55.
75. It is apparent that the cartel stigma has in fact attached to the keiretsu
in the eyes of many Americans. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
76. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 3-5.
77. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 3.
78. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 3.
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an older financial keiretsu.79 For example, Toyota, the core
firm in its vertical keiretsu, is itself a member of the Mitsui
financial keiretsu.80 Another company within the Toyota
group, Chiyoda Fire and Marine Insurance, does not belong to
Mitsui, but does belong to the Fuyo financial keiretsu.8' Still
other firms within the Toyota group belong only to Toyota and
not to a separate financial group."
All varieties of keiretsu are currently much less tightly
knit than critics seem to think. The tendency of companies
within one keiretsu to deal with other group members is one of
the factors the critics believe excludes Americans from compet-
ing in the Japanese market.' This exclusion is theoretically
possible because, all things being equal, member firms prefer
to buy from other member firms.85 But things are seldom
equal, and keiretsu selling patterns are far from exclusive. In
fact, many maintain that the strength of keiretsu ties has al-
ways been exaggerated. 6
At least thirty percent of the auto parts industry has al-
ways sold to firms outside their own keiretsu" Although
smaller firms have tended to sell within the keiretsu, even
these companies are experiencing a need to broaden their cli-
ent base.' For example, the component parts company that
T. Boone Pickens tried to infiltrate, Koito Manufacturing,
79. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 4.
80. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 4.
81. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 4.
82. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 4-5.
83. See, e.g., Powell & Thomas, supra note 11, at 38 ("The Japanese cite sta-
tistics showing that in the major corporate groupings, only around 11 percent of
total sales are made among member companies."); Mary Ann Maskery, Downturn
Batters Japanese Auto Suppliers; Cracks Appear in Keiretsus as Losses Continue to
Swell, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Aug. 10, 1992, at 1 ("The shift away from the keiretsu
actually started 10 years ago . . . because manufacturers were looking for compa-
nies with better technical capability.").
84. See The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 19,
1991) (statement of Lynn Williams, "[Ilf you have Keiretsu, you have an
exclusionary buying practice, which means that somebody who makes a good prod-
uct can't get in. That means my companies can't get in.").
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Maskery, supra note 83, at 1. ("'The interpretation of keiretsu as
a power relationship was never really appropriate.'"); see also Japanese Business
Methods, supra note 45, at 19 ("Japanese industry is both more fragmented and
more volatile than people suppose.").
87. Maskery, supra note 83.
88. Maskery, supra note 83.
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while a member of the Toyota keiretsu, still continues to sell
its parts to Toyota's main competitors when it is economically
advantageous to do so. 9 Economic incentive to sell outside
the group may have resulted from the reduction of Koito's
profit margins due to competition between Koito and other
suppliers for Toyota's business. In addition, generally sluggish
global economic conditions in the early 1990s may have neces-
sitated member companies' expanded search for customers,
further eroding any reliance on their keiretsu.
Not only have the exclusive tendencies of keiretsu possibly
been overblown, but any actual exclusion suffered by American
businesses may be exaggerated as well.9" The United States'
exports to Japan have been, and continue to be, on the rise.
Japan increased its purchases of auto parts to $10.5 billion in
1991, up from $1.7 billion just five years prior.9 And the Jap-
anese expect to increase purchases from United States auto
part manufacturers to nineteen billion dollars by 1994.92 Per-
haps the overall openness of Japan's markets should not be
judged by the imbalance between exports and imports, but
rather by the fact that Japan is the world's third largest im-
porter.93 Economic evidence supporting or negating the effect
of keiretsu on the exclusion of United States exports from Ja-
pan would be carefully examined in any antitrust analysis. 4
Both varieties of keiretsu may be compared to an integra-
tion or merger which would be analyzed in the United States
under the Clayton Act.95 The financial keiretsu most closely
89. See Tsurumi, Don't Beat the Keiretsu, supra note 65, § 3, at 11.
90. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S3752 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1992) (statement of
Sen. Hatfield) ("Japan is . . . Oregon's largest trading partner, exporting almost 3
billion dollars' worth of goods to Japan last year."); see also Melamed, supra note
44:
[T]he U.S. exports more to Japan than it does to Germany, France, and
Italy combined. Conversely, Japan imports more per capita from America
and at a higher percentage of its gross national product than the U.S.
imports from Japan . . . Japan trade barriers are lower than other in-
dustrial nations. Its average tariff for industrial products is
2.6%-compared with 3% for America-and its non-tariff barriers, such as
quotas and licenses, are similar to those in America.
91. See 138 CONG. REC. H6039 (daily ed. July 8, 1992) (statement of Rep. Ar-
cher).
92. Id.
93. See Japan's Troublesome Imports, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 1992, at 61.
94. See infra text accompanying note 124.
95. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988).
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resemble a United States conglomerate structure.96 Conglom-
erates are related firms that are not in competition with each
other and that do not have a significant buyer and seller rela-
tionship.9" Proctor and Gamble, with its many divisions such
as cleaning products, processed foods, and appliances, is one
example of a conglomerate. The vertical keiretsu, on the
other hand, resemble a United States vertically integrated
company-a company that provides for itself goods and servic-
es (such as component parts) which it would otherwise pur-
chase on the open market.98 In a vertical keiretsu, however,
rather than owning the supplier or retailer outright, the core
company primarily maintains only a long-term relationship
with the many other member companies, occasionally owning
some stock of the other companies. Thus, the analogy is not
perfect. And recent enforcement under the Clayton Act has
also tended toward finding real anticompetitive danger only
with respect to the integration of competitors, which is not the
case with keiretsu.99
Another way to look at the vertical keiretsu might be un-
der section 1 of the Sherman Act as it would apply to vertical
restraints.'00 Section 1 prohibits agreements in restraint of
trade;' 0 ' even if the keiretsu member companies did not own
enough of one another to be considered under merger theory,
96. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 3.
97. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 5.04[1], at 417
(1992 ed.).
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., SPENCER W. WALLER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST
LAw § 3.03, at 3-9 (1992); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW § 7.4, at 210 (1985); Japanese-American Trade; Whingeing, ECONOMIST,
May 18, 1991, at 81
The problem with American complaints about tie-ups between firms, and
between industrial companies and banks, is that such ties exist in the
West, where they are often known as vertical integration. Unless they
link competitors, as in price-fixing cases, there is no particular reason
why such ties should be objectionable .... No one objects, for example,
if Ford encourages one of its suppliers by paying higher prices for parts
to help it through a rough spell. In the end, competition ... will
squeeze Ford's margins if its treatment of suppliers is so preferential as
to be uneconomic. American negotiators seem to think the same logic
does not apply to Japanese firms.
100. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
101. Section 1 provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal."
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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they may be behaving illegally if any of their agreements have
a negative effect on competition. Such an agreement might
grant an exclusive territory to a retailer, or require a parts
supplier to sell only to one'manufacturer of finished products.
III. COMPARISON OF KEIRETSU WITH UNITED STATES CORPO-
RATE COMBINATIONS
While some members of Congress argue that the United
States ought to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially, most
seem to want the Japanese to apply their own antimonopoly
laws as we would apply our antitrust laws here. The main flaw
with this suggestion is that the way these critics assume Unit-
ed States courts would apply our antitrust laws (i.e., with a per
se illegality standard) is not, in fact, the way they would be
applied to a keiretsu-like situation. The message outwardly
conveyed by these critics has been, in essence, "Do as we do,
level the playing field, or suffer the consequences." But because
their assumptions are flawed with respect to the actual
keiretsu behavior and the appropriate antitrust standards to be
applied to such behavior, the message has really been: "Do
more than we do, slant the field in our favor, and then maybe
we'll play with you."
A. United States Conglomerates and Financial Keiretsu
There is no perfectly analogous structure in the United
States to the Japanese financial keiretsu. The closest compari-
son might be to a conglomerate, a large corporation with non-
competing business operations spanning many different indus-
tries. A conglomerate is formed when a corporation either
wholly acquires another company (a "pure" or "true" conglom-
erate), enters into a new field by internal expansion ("de novo
expansion"), or creates a new separate entity through a joint
venture agreement with another company.'0 2 The pattern
usually entails the gradual growth of one central firm or par-
ent company into new areas of business. 3
102. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IM-
PLICATIONS § 7.03, at 269 (1988).
103. A merger that will receive scrutiny in this area often will be characterized
in one of two ways. Either it will involve firms that manufacture the same prod-
uct, but sell it in different areas of the country, called "market extension," or
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As previously, mentioned, this analogy is not accurate,
because financial keiretsu do not operate in this fashion. While
the keiretsu member companies are centered around a common
bank, the bank may own only up to five percent of any member
firm's stock under Japanese law. °4 Moreover, the various
member firms operate independently of one another with over-
lapping control only in the sense that corporate presidents
meet regularly to discuss common problem areas.'0 5 Thus,
not only is the extent of actual ownership much less in a finan-
cial keiretsu than in a conglomerate, but the pattern of con-
trolling behavior is less hierarchical and more cooperative.
Even if the financial keiretsu were more closely analogous
to a conglomerate, however, the Clayton Act governing the
behavior of conglomerate mergers has not been interpreted by
courts to employ the per se illegality analysis wielded by critics
of keiretsu.' Not only is the standard of analysis less strin-
gent than critics suggest, but for the last two decades, the
policy surrounding mergers has become increasingly toler-
ant.'0 7 Since many conglomerates come about through a
merger of noncompeting firms, there is no danger that the
combination will lead to direct monopolization in an already
competitive industry. Very often market conditions are compet-
itive enough that such a merger would not effectively lessen
firms that sell different products which come from the same general family as, for
instance, laundry detergent and dryer sheet fabric softener, known as "product
extension." See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 12.1, at 320; HOLMES, supra
note 97, § 5.04[1], at 417.
104. See FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 31.
105. See JEI REPORT, supra note 63, at 7. While the meeting of corporate pres-
idents sounds like a potential cartel, the fact that the companies are not competi-
tors precludes such a characterization. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
106. The per se illegality test is a judicially created device reserved for those
activities that are deemed inevitably anti-competitive, such as price fixing. United
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Conglomerate mergers are
not considered inevitably anti-competitive. See HOLMES, supra note 97, § 5.0412], at
418.
Clayton Act § 7 explicitly prohibits anyone from acquiring "any part of the
stock or other share capital," or, if the entity is under the jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, from acquiring "the whole or any part of the assets of
another . . . engaged also in commerce . ..where .. . the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
107. Ernest Gellhorn & Kathryn M. Fenton, Vertical Restraints During the
Reagan Administration: A Program in Search of a Policy, ANTITRUST BULL., Fall
1988, at 543, 544.
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competition. Given the right conditions, however, it is possible
that anticompetitive results will follow a conglomerate merg-
er.108 Three main theories have evolved as to when these
combinations may be anticompetitive: (1) the entrenchment
theory; (2) the perceived potential entrant theory; and, (3) the
actual potential entrant theory.' °9
The entrenchment theory is based on the concern that the
combination of two major players in the market could deter
potential future entrants simply because of the daunting size
of the resulting entity.110 Anyone wanting to start a business
will be less likely to enter a field where a large company is
already dominant. Potential competitors may fear that the
large firm created out of the combination is too firmly en-
trenched and will prevent them from effectively earning a
meaningful share of the market."'
The perceived potential competition theory invalidates a
conglomerate merger if prior to the merger there had been a
procompetitive influence on the product market by the acquir-
ing firm."' This influence could arise when those already in
the market keep their prices just above marginal costs to pre-
vent enticing a feared competitor to enter the market. The
feared competitor is considered to be waiting in the wings for
market conditions to change such that it is attractive to enter,
as when the profit margin is high."' If the existing firms
keep their profit margin low, conditions may never be attrac-
tive enough, and consumers will reap the benefits of lower
prices. But once the threat is removed by the potential compet-
itor having entered the market by acquisition, the incentive to
keep prices low may be eliminated."
The actual potential competition theory, although never
actually applied by the Supreme Court, suggests that when a
company is actually planning to enter the market by de novo
expansion or by acquisition of a much smaller "toe-hold" firm,
competition may be harmed if the company instead resorts to
108. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 588-89 (1967).
109. WALLER, supra note 99, § 3.04, at 3-11 to 3-12.
110. See Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 588-89.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 578; see also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,
531-32 (1973).
113. See Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 532.
114. Id.; see also HOLMES, supra note 97, § 5.04[2], at 422.
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merging with a significant existing firm." 5 Often de novo ex-
pansion is more costly than a merger. But where a company is
shown to have the actual capability of entering de novo, some
courts will require that it do so. This policy purportedly pre-
serves competition by increasing the number of significant
competitors in the market.1 6
The Department of Justice and the courts may be satisfied
with a conglomerate merger if, instead of acquiring an existing
company, the entering firm expands de novo into the field or
purchases a much smaller firm."' By expanding from within,
the market is gaining a new competitor and a potential in-
crease in competition. A similar increase in competition results
if the acquired firm is very small."8 The other firms in the
market are then faced with a more viable competitor and must
react accordingly. Such increases outweigh any potential dele-
terious effects from the lost threat of a perceived potential
entrant."19
While there are potential dangers to competition after a
conglomerate merger, theorists have maintained that they may
have significant procompetitive effects. 2 ° The positive threat
of takeovers will be more prevalent when such mergers are
allowed, which may help to persuade incumbent managers in a
company to keep costs and prices at a competitive level. 2'
There will also be efficiencies gained by two companies merg-
ing, such as the companies' ability to combine advertising ef-
forts to reduce costs.' 22 Such efficiencies would theoretically
then be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices.
Thus, courts are unwilling to dismiss these combinations auto-
matically as illegal under a per se standard.123 They will in-
115. See United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499, 504 (2d Cir. 1980).
116. See Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 1982). See also
HOLMES, supra note 97, § 5.0412], at 425.
117. See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 742 (D.
Md. 1976); see also HOLMES, supra note 97, § 5.04[21, at 424.
118. Siemens, 621 F.2d at 502 n.4.
119. See United States v. Marine Bancorp. Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 616 (1974).
120. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 12.2, at 321-22; HOLMES, supra
note 97, § 5.04[2], at 418; See generally YALE BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982).
121. ERNEST GELLHORN, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 375 (3d ed. 1986).
122. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 574 (1967); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 12.2, at 321.
123. HOLMES, supra note 97, § 5.04[2), at 418.
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stead consider all relevant economic factors, such as the mar-
ket share of each firm within its relevant market before and
after the merger or expansion, and the extent of barriers to
entry into the field, before deciding whether a conglomerate
merger constitutes an antitrust violation.'24
Substantial concentration in the target market has always
been a threshold issue for finding a Clayton Act section 7 viola-
tion in a conglomerate merger.125 The theories explained
above will not even apply if the market is already competi-
tive.'26 Courts will have to examine fully the structure of the
market and the nature of the industry to determine concentra-
tion and competitiveness 2 7-- an analysis far removed from
per se illegality.
The reason for requiring concentration can be understood
by considering a hypothetical: Acquiring firm Z, which makes
cereal, buys soft drink beverage firm X, which had been one of
124. See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 593; United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 745 (D. Md. 1976).
125. United States v. Marine Bancorp. Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1974). Con-
centration may be measured in a number of ways. A two-firm or four-firm ratio is
often used which adds the market shares of the top two or four firms, respective-
ly. Sufficient concentration has been found, for instance, at a two-firm ratio of
41.9%, Heublein, Inc., 96 F.T.C. 385, 584-85 (1980), and a four-firm ratio of 58%,
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1253 (C.D. Cal. 1973),
affd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974). Another measure of market concentration is
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) which calculates concentration by adding
the squares of the individual market shares of each firm in the relevant market.
For example, if there are ten firms in the relevant market each with a ten per-
cent market share (102 x 102 x 102 x 102 x 102 x 102 x 102 x 102 x 102 x 102),
the HHI would be 1,000. See GELLHORN, supra note 121, at 367; AREEDA &
KAPLOW, supra note 73, 9 527, at 873; HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 12.5, at 336.
A market will generally not be considered substantially concentrated under this
method of calculation until it reaches an HHI of 1,800. HOVENKAMP, supra note
99, § 12.5, at 336; see also the discussion of 1984 merger guidelines, infra notes
181-87 and accompanying text.
126. Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 630. Whether a market is deemed competi-
tive will depend almost entirely on its defined parameters. A market is defined on
two levels: the product market and the geographic market. The product market is
established by looking at the product in question and determining if consumers
would be able to find any reasonable substitutes. United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 380 (1956). If other products are interchangeable
with the one in question as evidenced by similarity in prices, uses, and character-
istics, then they will be included in the relevant product market. Id. The geo-
graphic market can be demonstrated as the area where a firm could raise its
prices without losing customers to other competitors. See GELLHORN, supra note
121, at 109.
127. HOLMES, supra note 97, § 5.04[2], at 418.
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ten competitors, each of which have equal shares in the rele-
vant beverage market. As previously explained, the theory of
perceived potential competition rests on the notion that the
competitive behavior of the remaining firms will deteriorate
without the motivating threat of the acquiring firm's waiting
on the sidelines to enter the market.12 The nine remaining
beverage firms in this case would have no rational basis for
claiming that the reason they had performed competitively in
the past was due to a perceived threat of entry by Z cereal
company. Their competitive behavior prior to the merger was
due to the threat from their nine other actual competitors.
Thus, the merger between Z and X would have no negative
effect on competition in the soft drink beverage market and
should be upheld.
Substantial market concentration is also required to inval-
idate a merger based either on the theory of actual potential
competition or the theory of entrenchment.'29 Under the first
theory, if the market is already highly de-concentrated, as in
the soft drink example above, then there is no reason to re-
quire Z to go out of its way to enter the market through a less
convenient method, since the acquisition of X poses no danger
to the structure of the market. Under the entrenchment theo-
ry, if X does not have a significant market share, then the fear
that X has an insurmountable advantage is unrealistic. Thus,
it is unlikely that a plaintiff would be successful in proving
that a merger tends to restrain competition under section 7
without significant market concentration.
30
128. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 97, § 5.0412], at 424.
130. Under the perceived potential entrant theory, once the market is found to
be of sufficient concentration, the plaintiff must still show a) that the existing
firms in the market had perceived the acquiring firm as a potential new entrant
into the field prior to the merger, and b) that this perception made those existing
firms behave in a procompetitive manner. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
410 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1973). Under the theory of actual potential competition, the
plaintiff must, in addition to substantial concentration, prove that the acquiring
firm had other feasible means of entering the market without acquiring that par-
ticular firm-whether by internal expansion or by acquiring a much smaller com-
pany-and that these other means would likely have been more procompetitive.
Marine Bancorp., 418 U.S. at 630-33. And under the entrenchment theory, the
plaintiff must prove a significant competitive advantage to the merged firms which
is not reasonably available to the other market participants, as well as a discern-
able impact on those participants and future entrants. United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 774 (D. Md. 1976).
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In the case of financial keiretsu, it could be argued that
the conglomerate merger analyses are inappropriate because
the connections are looser among keiretsu firms than among
United States conglomerate companies.' 3' Even if the analy-
ses were applied, the industries represented within these
keiretsu are typically close to being perfectly competitive, as in
the soft drink example above, since each of the six or seven
main financial keiretsu participate in the major industries. 32
And if the market were defined as being larger than Japan
alone, competitors in the United States, Germany, and Great.
Britain would further dilute the share of each keiretsu.
133
Thus, it is questionable whether an antitrust analysis of a
typical keiretsu would progress past the threshold requirement
of substantial market concentration.
The breadth of analysis that goes into determining wheth-
er a conglomerate merger will be allowed under the Clayton
Act is much wider than would be entertained under the analy-
sis seemingly advocated by American opponents of keiretsu.
The keiretsu critics would have them condemned as per se
illegal and marked for dissolution134-- a stricter standard
than that which is currently applied to conglomerate counter-
parts here at home. In the context of a merger, if the courts
have determined that competition was lessened, they could
rescind the transaction, returning the companies to their
premerger state. But in the context of keiretsu, where connec-
tions are often based on human relationships, separation
would prove problematic. Furthermore, dissolution or divesti-
ture is a remedy of last resort and difficult to implement prac-
tically. Given that the United States approach to conglomerate
mergers-behavior which is arguably more threatening to
competition than that of keiretsu-permits the consideration of
all relevant market factors, it is unjustifiable to endorse an
approach toward financial keiretsu which would deny any evi-
dence of procompetitive effects.
131. See supra text accompanying footnote 99.
132. See Helou, supra note 74, app. at 130-31.
133. For a discussion of market definition, see supra note 126.
134. See 138 CONG. REC. S1339 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Exon) ("I think the United States should demand a breakup of the keiretsu sys-
tem, which . . . locks major Japanese companies together into one giant monop-
oly . . ").
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B. United States Vertical Restraints and Vertical Keiretsu
The situation in the United States that is most analogous
to vertical keiretsu is a vertical restraint. Vertical restraints
are agreements between firms at different stages of the pro-
duction process-a manufacturer and a distributor, for exam-
ple-which may affect the free flow of trade.'35 These agree-
ments can take any number of forms, none of which entirely
match the vertical keiretsu. There are those involving price
restraints as in resale price maintenance and those involving
nonprice restraints such as exclusive distribution agreements,
territorial restrictions, tying arrangements, and vertical inte-
gration.'36 Many of these agreements, such as resale price
maintenance and territorial restrictions, are examined under
section 1 of the Sherman Act governing agreements in re-
straint of trade.'37 Tying arrangements, as when a seller re-
fuses to sell a desired item to a purchaser unless that purchas-
er also buys another, unwanted product, are illegal under sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act.' And vertical integration, or
mergers, are analyzed under section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
are conglomerate mergers.'39 Before deciding whether the per
se standard relied upon by critics of keiretsu is as inappropri-
ate in this area as it would be with respect to financial
keiretsu, it is first necessary to ascertain which standards
would be used in typical United States cases involving vertical
restraints.
All agreements, whether among competitors or among
vertically related companies, are analyzed under the rule of
reason standard first articulated in Standard Oil Co. of New
Jersey v. United States 4 ° Only if an - activity is held to be in-
135. WALLER, supra note 99, § 3.03, at 3-9.
136. See generally GELLHORN, supra note 121, at 278-333, 342-54.
137. See supra note 101.
138. Section 3 provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful . . . to lease or make a sale . . . on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser shall not use
or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor ... of the lessor or seller ...
where the effect of such . . . may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly . ...
Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
139. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). See supra note 106 for pertinent
text of § 7.
140. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Only restraints which are unreasonable are illegal un-
der the Sherman Act. This necessitates an examination of industry specifics and
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evitably anticompetitive will it be carved out as a separate
category for evaluation under the per se illegality stan-
dard." The law in this area has changed several times over
the years, but today only resale price maintenance and ty-
ing are considered per se categories in the vertical context.
4 3
The decision in Business Electronics v. Sharp Electronics put
the fate of per se illegality for resale price maintenance in
considerable question by making the showing required for a
prima facie case considerably more difficult.'" In his majori-
ty opinion, Justice Scalia held that an agreement to fix prices
could not be inferred merely from the termination by a manu-
facturer of a retailer. The plaintiff must show some additional
evidence of an underlying agreement between the manufactur-
er and another company to state a prima facie case. Since
concrete evidence of such an underlying agreement is notori-
ously difficult to uncover, a plaintiff is now less likely to sur-
vive summary judgment by the defendant.
It is possible that a given keiretsu may engage in one or
another of these vertical restraint activities. But the problem
of potentially illegal activities should be separated from an
analysis of the structure itself. Each potentially illegal activity
actual effects on competition in order to understand which restraints are unreason-
able.
141. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988).
142. Nonprice vertical restraints were initially subjected to the rule of reason
analysis in White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). A few years
later the Court changed its position and established a per se rule for any restric-
tions on distributors' or retailers' resale rights in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Lower courts were uncomfortable with the rule set up
in Schwinn, however, and found ways to avoid the per se test. See, e.g., Carter-
Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Ct. Cl. 1971); Janel Sales
Corp. v. Lavin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir. 1968). Only ten years
after Schwinn the Supreme Court once again reversed itself in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and held that the rule of reason
should be applied to nonprice vertical restrictions.
143. The 'earliest case dealing with vertical restraints was Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In Miles the Supreme
Court established that resale price maintenance was per se illegal, and they have
not explicitly retreated from this position. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co:, 377
U.S. 13, 17 (1964); California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 102 (1980); Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 724. See also WALLER, supra note
99, § 1.08, at 1-22 to 1-23.
144. Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726-27; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1984) (holding that complaints to manufacturer
followed by termination of retailer were not enough to prove existence of an agree-
ment to set prices without showing a "plus factor").
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should be scrutinized separately under whichever law or stan-
dard applies. In the United States, most of these activities
would be evaluated under the rule of reason. And even if a
keiretsu activity qualified for per se illegality, the companies
involved could be enjoined from engaging in that activity fur-
ther, and possibly made to pay private damages, but the very
structure of the keiretsu itself need not be sacrificed. If the
structure of the vertical keiretsu were to receive antitrust anal-
ysis, it might best be accomplished under an integration theo-
ry. For vertical keiretsu, however, the United States counter-
part is a vertical rather than a conglomerate integration.
"A firm is vertically integrated whenever it performs for
itself some function that could otherwise be purchased on the
market."4 ' This kind of integration typically may come about
by de novo expansion or by merger. Some examples might be a
corporation opening its own public relations office, or a car
manufacturer beginning to make its own spark plugs. Often a
firm vertically integrates because its management is dissatis-
fied with the services or supplies being offered on the open
market, and feels that by expansion or merger it could provide
goods or services for itself better and less expensively. 4 ' As
with the conglomerate mergers, there are valid economic rea-
sons for integrating, such as reducing the transaction costs
associated with negotiating contracts.
147
Courts in the United States rely on two main justifications
for condemning vertical integration-the "foreclosure" theo-
ry148 and the "barrier to entry" theory.149 The foreclosure
theory suggests that if market conditions are right, competitors
of the newly integrated firm may be prevented from buying
needed supplies or from selling to essential customers. 50 The
barrier to entry theory, on the other hand, cautions that the
integration may make entering the market more difficult for
potential competitors, thus reducing the chances for increased
competition.' 5'
145. HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.1, at 191.
146. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.2, at 192.
147. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.2, at 193.
148. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962).
149. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 567 (1972) (also analyzed
under the foreclosure theory).
150. See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328.
151. See, e.g., Ford Motor, 405 U.S. at 567. Two other theories have occasional-
1128 [Vol. XIX:3
JAPANESE KEIRETSU
The theory of foreclosure was first developed in United
States v. Yellow Cab Co.'52 The Court held that a cab
manufacturer's acquisition of operating companies in several
major United States cities violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act 5 3 if by doing so the company intended to drive out com-
petitors in the market for taxi operation.'54 The Court was
concerned that by requiring its new operating companies to
buy exclusively from their manufacturing company, the defen-
dant was locking up the market such that other cab manufac-
turers would be unable to sell their cabs in the cities occupied
by Yellow Cab.'55 After the Clayton Act was amended to in-
clude vertical mergers,'56 the Supreme Court held that a
mere tendency toward foreclosure of competing firms was suf-
ficient to establish a violation."' The Court then further ex-
tended the theory to include purchases of stock as well as full
acquisitions in United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours &
Co. 5' In du Pont the Court found that the purchase of a
twenty-three percent stock interest by du Pont in General
Motors led to a thirty percent foreclosure of the automobile
finishes market. The Court relied heavily on what it deemed to
be the catch-it-in-its-incipiency spirit of the amendment in
finding this level of foreclosure enough to invalidate the acqui-
ly been used-the "leverage" theory, which recognizes the potentially coercive man-
ner in which a powerful firm may achieve its acquisition into another market, and
the "price squeeze" theory, which recognizes the possibility that an integrated firm
may be in a better position to charge discriminatory prices in an effort to drive
out competitors. See WAYNE D. COLLINS & JAMES R. LoFTiS, III, NON-HORIZONTAL
MERGER: LAW AND POLICY 1, 9 (1988).
152. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
153. The Sherman Act was relied upon because the Clayton Act did not explic-
itly apply to vertical mergers at the time. See AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 73,
505, at 808-14.
154. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 226; see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.3,
at 203.
155. Yellow Cab, 332 U.S. at 226-27.
156. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988); see also AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra
note 73, T 505, at 808-14 (discussing the amendment).
157. See generally Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (disal-
lowing a merger by a shoe manufacturer whose market share was approximately
5%, of a shoe retailer whose market share was only 1%).
158. 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (invalidating du Pont's purchase of a 23% stock inter-
est in General Motors). In holding that the market should be examined as of the
time of trial, not the time of acquisition, the Court found that 30% of the market
(defined as finishes for automobiles) was foreclosed to competitors in violation of
the "policy" of the Clayton Act amendments. Id. at 649-50.
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sition. Thus, if the total or partial integration of companies on
two levels of the production process prevents other companies
on either the buyer or seller level from effectively competing,
the merger may violate section 7.
The other major theory for condemning vertical integration
is the barrier to entry theory.'59 In Ford Motor Co. v. United
States,6 ° the Supreme Court condemned the auto
manufacturer's acquisition of a spark plug manufacturer, rea-
soning that slowly gaining control over all the elements re-
quired to manufacture automobiles would create a barrier to
entry of others into the auto industry.'6' In other words, the
fear is that if a manufacturer controls all the suppliers of parts
necessary to make a particular finished product, then anyone
wishing to make that finished product would also need to man-
ufacture the component parts to be able to compete. If they did
not, they would have no supply for the parts and would not be
able to enter the industry. The circuits are inconsistent in
their treatment of vertical integration. While some circuits
continue to abide by the earlier case law and adopt the foreclo-
sure or barrier to entry theories,'62 others find these mergers
acceptable.'63
For the foreclosure or barrier to entry theory to be ratio-
nally applied, however, the market structure must be highly
concentrated or already difficult to enter, giving the integrat-
ing company market power.'64 Just as with a conglomerate
merger, cases challenging a vertical merger are unlikely to
succeed unless at least one of the parties to the merger has
this significant market power.165 For instance, an effective
barrier to entry may exist where either the integrated firm has
a monopoly on the supplies needed by a new entering firm, or
where all remaining suppliers are unavailable because they
are similarly integrated into other manufacturers. But if there
159. See, e.g., HOVENICAMP, supra note 99, § 7.3, at 206-08.
160. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
161. Id. at 568-69.
162. See, e.g., Ash Grove Cement v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1978);
Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
163. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 355 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 1271, 1293-94 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
164. HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.03, at 204, 206.




are reasonably available alternative sources of supply, then no
barrier exists. For example, if soft drink beverage firm X at-
tempts to buy aluminum can company Q, the acquisition will
not be prevented if there are several other viable beverage
container manufacturing companies. Anyone wishing to enter
the soft drink manufacturing industry would be able to get
needed containers from one of these other sources, and would
not need cans from company Q in order to enter the field.
An integration may be prohibited due to high entry barri-
ers if one of the two companies is in an industry which is his-
torically difficult to enter.166 But if the barriers to entry for
each separate industry are low, then it is unlikely that the
newly integrated firm would itself be considered a barrier to
entry to the product markets represented by its constituent
companies. In the above example, if the beverage container
market were extremely concentrated-which would cut against
allowing the merger-but the costs and convenience of start-
ing, for instance, a glass bottle manufacturing plant, were such
that entry would be easy, then competition is unlikely to be
harmed by the merger. Mergers are generally disallowed if
they significantly lessen competition or tend to create a monop-
oly.'67 If competition is unhindered after a merger, however,
the merger should be allowed to proceed. 6 s Thus, a challeng-
er must show that the integrated firm had sufficient market
power to make the foreclosure of competitors meaningful or to
serve as a barrier to entry for potential competitors.
As with the analogy between financial keiretsu and con-
glomerates, the analogy between vertical keiretsu and vertical
integration is not a perfect one. When obtaining component
parts, American companies will most often choose one of the
two extremes on the, continuum of choices-either they will
shop around for the best price on the open market, or they will
integrate and produce the item for themselves. The Japanese
keiretsu system falls between the two extremes in that Toyota,
for example, may have a trustworthy, long-term business rela-
tionship with several suppliers of each part and tend to buy
from that pool of companies.'69 This way keiretsu members
166. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.03, at 207.
167. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988). For a discussion of the legislative
intent behind the Act, see AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 73, 9 505, at 812.
168. See, e.g., Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 352 (2d Cir. 1979).
169. See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, A Japanese Buddy System That Could Benefit
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get the price advantage of an arms-length deal as well as the
information cost savings of producing the part themselves. 7 °
The closest analogous United States case might be United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 7' wherein the ac-
quisition only involved a twenty-three percent stock interest
rather than a full integration. In 1949 du Pont was the largest
producer of auto finishes and fabrics in the United States. It
supplied General Motors (which at the time was the largest
manufacturer of autos in the world) with sixty-seven percent of
its finishes and 35.7 percent of its fabrics.' 2 The Court used
as a relevant product market auto finishes and auto fab-
rics;'. the combined figures indicated that du Pont's sales to
General Motors amounted to 32.7 percent of all auto finishes,
and 17.4 percent of all auto fabrics sold. 7 4 These figures es-
tablished sufficient market power to invoke the foreclosure
argument and resulted in finding a violation.' 5 General Mo-
tors admittedly had much greater market power at the time,
since they were not yet facing significant competition from
abroad. But the market power attributed to du Pont was based
on what some believe to be an inaccurate relevant market. 76
It would be difficult to arrive at the same result with re-
spect to the Toyota keiretsu, however. Foreclosure would de-
pend on finding significant concentration in either the automo-
bile market or the various component part markets. 177 A find-
ing of concentration would itself depend on the relevant prod-
U.S. Business, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 1991, at 32; Kinsley, supra note 55, at 4 ("Gen-
eral Motors still makes far more of its own parts than Toyota buys from 'captive'
suppliers.").
170. Core firms like Toyota have many suppliers for most parts and they will
reward the most efficient suppliers by giving them larger orders. In this way the
suppliers within the keiretsu are motivated to compete with one another for the
core company's business. Blinder, supra note 169, at 32.
171. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
172. Id. at 596.
173. Id at 593-94.
174. See COLLINS & LOFTIs, supra note 151, at 15 n.71.
175. See COLLINS & LoFrIs, supra note 151, at 15 n.71.
176. There is some speculation as to whether the correct relevant market was
defined in du Pont, since the finishes supplied to General Motors could be used
for purposes other than those associated with automobiles. If the market had been
defined more broadly to include these other purposes, sufficient market power
might not have been found and the acquisition might have been allowed. See
HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.3, at 205 n.8.
177. See supra text accompanying note 164.
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uct and geographic markets. If the relevant geographic market
were only Japan, sufficient concentration could be found, and
Toyota's market share could be relatively high.7 ' If this were
the case, there could conceivably be a problem with suppliers
outside of the Toyota keiretsu being foreclosed from selling to
auto manufacturers. But as previously mentioned, the regular
suppliers for Toyota sell their parts to other auto manufactur-
ers, and the suppliers for those manufacturers sell to Toyota.
Thus, if foreclosure is not an actual result of this relationship,
the mere possibility that it could have been a result should not
invalidate the relationship. And if competitors from the United
States, Great Britain, and Germany-to name a few-were
included in the market definition, then Toyota's market share
would be considerably smaller and the risk of foreclosure even
less.
Furthermore, whether a merger or vertical restraint is
actually illegal under United States antitrust law is a separate
issue from what it will take to even bring a case to court.
While private plaintiffs will likely rely on the case law to de-
cide whether or not they have a meritorious claim against a
company engaging in one of these practices, the government
establishes set guidelines for deciding when a given activity
ought to be challenged directly by the government. During the
recent Reagan and Bush administrations, for example, both
vertical and conglomerate integration were afforded more le-
nient scrutiny than during previous administrations.'79 Most
of this relaxation is attributable to increased reliance on eco-
nomic analysis to determine whether a given merger had an
anticompetitive effect.'
In 1984 the Department of Justice issued revised merger
guidelines which reflected the view that conglomerate and
178. Even this is questionable, however, since Toyota faces several able compet-
itors within Japan such as Nissan, Mitsubishi, Isuzu, and Daihatsu. See Rapoport,
supra note 55, at 81.
179. See, e.g., COLLINS & LOFTIS, supra note 151, at 1.
180. See, e.g., COLLINS & LOFrIS, supra note 151. The Reagan Administration's
policies were heavily influenced by the Chicago School economic theories. See, e.g.,
ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); Frank Easterbrook, Workable Anti-
trust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696 (1986); POSNER, supra note 165; Richard
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CIII. L. REV. 6 (1981).
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vertical mergers are seldom anticompetitive.'"' The economic
analysis on which the guidelines are based focuses on the po-
tentially procompetitive effects of these mergers as efficiency is
gained by reducing transaction costs and increasing economies
of scale." 2 These savings will purportedly be passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices. Under this theory, if a
merger promotes efficiency such that consumers reap the bene-
fit, it should be permitted-even if firms in competition with
the integrated firm may suffer losses.
183
The guidelines have several significant features which
have reduced the frequency of challenges to mergers. One such
feature is the requirement that the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) measurement of market concentration exceed
eighteen hundred to trigger a presumption of illegality. 184 As
a result, intervention generally occurs at a higher concentra-
tion threshold than had been the case under previous calcula-
tion methods.'85 The guidelines also abandoned the foreclo-
sure theory as a basis for concern and instead focused more on
the potential barriers to entry.8 6 If an integrated firm could
not raise its prices for long without being faced with new com-
petitors, then the barriers to entry are believed to be low
enough that competition could not be harmed by the integra-
tion.
187
In addition to these changes, the Department of Justice
only challenged a nonhorizontal integration during this period
181. 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823 (1984).
182. Anytime a company reduces the number of steps involved in the total
organization of its operations it is saving on transaction costs. If, for instance, a
shoe manufacturer buys its own retail outlets, the company will save money by
reducing the number of individual transactions it previously had to negotiate with
independent retailers. Likewise, when a company can produce its products in larg-
er quantities, the marginal cost of each additional item goes down since the entire
process of production is set in motion fewer times-economies of scale. In the
above example, the large guaranteed market for the manufacturer's shoes will
allow it to forecast its production schedule more accurately, which in turn will
provide economies of scale. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.2, at 192-95.
183. This is reflective of the view that the antitrust laws are best used to
protect competition (which benefits consumers) rather than competitors (which can
hurt consumers). See HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.3, at 207.
184. See supra note 125 (explaining how to calculate the HHI).
185. See GELLHORN, supra note 121, at 368.
186. For an examination of the common law theory, see supra notes 159-63,
and accompanying text.
187. See GELLHORN, supra note 121, at 368.
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when the following three conditions were present: (1) the inte-
gration was so extensive that new entrants would have had to
enter both fields simultaneously in order to compete; (2) the
necessity of two-level entry was a significant deterrent to mar-
ket entry; and, (3) the nature of the fields was such that the
capacity of minimally efficient scale plants is significantly
different for each level. 88 These conditions occur so infre-
quently that challenges to nonhorizontal mergers since the
guidelines took effect have been almost nonexistent.
189
Under Japanese enforcement practices, long-term business
relationships like keiretsu will not be challenged unless they
involve some form of coercion which precludes one party from
buying or selling to other companies, or they detrimentally
affect the ability of a party to find alternative trading part-
ners. 9 ° This standard is similar to the foreclosure theory as
articulated by United States courts in vertical integration
cases. As in the United States, initiating a challenge requires
that one firm be "influential in the market," which, under the
Japanese guidelines, translates into at least a ten percent
market share.' 9 ' But this alone will not be enough for finding
a violation of the Japanese antimonopoly law prohibiting exclu-
sive dealing.'92 And as we have already seen, it is question-
able whether these keiretsu are even dealing exclusively with
other member firms. 9 '
Neither the conglomerate nor the vertical integration mod-
el of the United States is perfectly analogous to a Japanese
keiretsu of any variety. Even if the comparison unveiled a clos-
er similarity, United States antitrust laws would not be ap-
plied as an absolute bar to keiretsu activities as their critics
would have us believe. The level of concentration needed to
188. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,835, at § 4.21 (1984); see also
WALLER, supra note 99, § 3.03, at 3-10 to 3-11; HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.4,
at 210.
189. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 99, § 7.4, at 213; Louis B. Schwartz,
The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Coun-
seling or Propaganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 575,
590-94 (1983); Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, The 1982 Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment, 71 CAL. L. REV. 535, 571-73
(1983).
190. See generally FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 26.
191. FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 18.
192. FTC GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at 18.
193. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
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prove a violation under the Sherman Act or under the Clayton
Act is much higher than that present in the markets in which
the Japanese keiretsu participate. And even if a violation could
be established, the wholesale dismantling advocated by these
critics should be the last remedy proposed-if such a proposal
were entertained at all.
IV. CONCLUSION
An end to trade tensions between the United States and
Japan is far from imminent. The bilateral trade deficit is
climbing once again, changes under the Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative are slow when they are forthcoming at all,
and protectionist*responses to these perceived problems may be
gaining a foothold in Congress. The problems are intensified by
'the fact that most of the impressions surrounding the Japa-
nese keiretsu-most often blamed for these trade difficul-
ties-have been shrouded in misconceptions. Many have as-
sumed that these groupings of companies are cartels and that
they would be illegal under United States antitrust law. But
keiretsu are not cartels. The financial keiretsu are groups span-
ning many different noncompeting industries similar to con-
glomerates in the United States, and the vertical keiretsu are
groups arranged along production and distribution lines, also
similar to vertical integration here. If keiretsu behavior could
be subjected to scrutiny under the United States antitrust
laws-which is itself questionable because of the competitive
structure of the industries involved-the per se test assumed
by the critics of keiretsu would not apply. The keiretsu defen-
dants would instead be permitted to introduce evidence of
procompetitive business justifications which would tend to
relieve them from liability. Furthermore, even if the keiretsu
were found to have crossed the anticompetitive line, the drastic
remedy of dissolution would seldom be entertained.
What has engendered the current attack on keiretsu if not
a rational legal and factual analysis?194 It is indisputable
that the Japanese are highly successful in several major indus-
194. See Japan's Peculiar Ways, Cont'd., ECONOMIST, June 29, 1991, at 12 ("By
and large, the popular American view of Japan is driven more by paranoia than
by knowledge or common sense."); Kinsley, supra note 55, at 4 ("Clearly, explana-




tries and that their rise to prominence has been swift and
impressive. If anything, the stiff competition among various
keiretsu groups may have contributed to their global success.
They do not buy exclusively from member firms, but often go
outside the group when economic circumstances demand. Al-
though they are currently buying from the United States-the
Japanese buy more per capita from the United States than do
we from them-our domestic manufacturers would naturally
like a level of success comparable to theirs, which is just not
the case at this time. In short, keiretsu are successful compa-
nies which know the value of long-term planning and security.
If there are problems of an antitrust or antimonopoiy law
nature, which are bound to exist in individual instances, the
isolated incidents should be dealt with individually under
whichever law is appropriate. The abolishment of the entire
keiretsu structure hardly seems warranted because some
anticompetitive activity may be found on occasion. It would be
like ordering the dissolution of all conglomerates in the United
States because one such company committed an antitrust of-
fense. Thus, dismantling a production scheme that may have
enriched not only the Japanese, but the whole world, does not
seem to be the answer.195 Consistency should be the key. As
a start, we could stop trying to turn our antitrust laws into a
bludgeon to smash keiretsu when similar behavior here might
simply get a slap on the back of the hand.
Perhaps the United States should instead look at what we
can do domestically to stimulate growth in industries which
have a better chance of gaining export business than does the
automobile industry. If the amount of time and effort expended
on the Structural Impediments Initiative, and now on the pro-
posed retaliatory legislation, were spent instead on addressing
domestic problems which cripple our own businesses, then
perhaps we would not need to strain ourselves trying to find a
culprit in the Japanese keiretsu.
Suzanna C. Miller
195. See Japanese Business Methods, supra note 45, at 19.
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